Just a few years ago, the political map of the Western Hemisphere seemed settled. From Kirchner’s Argentina to Joe Biden’s United States, passing through Nicolás Maduro, Gustavo Petro, Gabriel Boric, Pedro Castillo, and Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the vast majority of the continent was governed by left-wing movements or regulated democracies, both with a strong interventionist bias. In Europe, the landscape was not very different: social democracies, technocratic center-right governments, and self-described “progressive” administrations all coincided in a constant expansion of regulation.
The European breaking point was not rhetorical; it was empirical. It came with the election of Giorgia Meloni in Italy in 2022, the first pragmatic and fiscally credible right-wing government to achieve stability, employment, and market confidence in postwar Italy. For decades, the country had been presented as the “chronic sick man” of Europe: low growth, high debt, and fragile governments. Yet in just two years, Meloni altered that script. In 2025, Italy reduced its fiscal deficit from levels close to 8% of GDP to around 3.1%, recovering financial credibility within the European Union. At the same time, it reached a record employment rate of 62.5%, the highest since comparable records began, with more than 500 thousand new jobs. The debt spread against Germany fell to historic lows. In migration matters, agreements with North African countries reduced irregular sea arrivals by 65%, and reinforced policing restored control to critical areas, driving a record year for tourism.
The Argentine case is even more revealing because it started from an extreme situation. When Javier Milei assumed power at the end of 2023, Argentina had accumulated annual inflation above 210%, a structural fiscal deficit, and a country risk above 2,600 basis points. Twelve months later, the panorama was radically different. In 2025, Argentina recorded twelve consecutive months of financial surplus, something unprecedented in the twenty-first century so far. Monthly inflation fell from peaks of 25.5% to levels close to 2–3%, oil production grew more than 30% year-over-year, and total employment remained close to 21 million people. The market reacted forcefully: Argentine bonds became the best-performing in the world in 2024–2025, and the country risk index fell below 800 points. Milei did not promise immediate prosperity; he promised fiscal order and rules. And the data show that this order began to bear fruit.
The United States confirms the pattern from another scale. In less than one year of Donald Trump 2.0, the U.S. economy closed 2025 with figures that contradict the narrative of Western stagnation. In the third quarter of 2025, GDP grew at an annualized rate of 4.3%, driven by domestic consumption, manufacturing, and energy exports. Annual inflation fell to 2.8%, once again approaching the 2% inflation target, while unemployment remained below 5%, with net private-sector job creation. On the energy front, oil production reached a historic record of 13.8 million barrels per day, reducing domestic costs and strengthening industrial competitiveness. In security matters, the main urban centers registered a 17.3% decline in homicides. In addition, the main stock market indexes closed 2025 at historic highs, signaling confidence in an environment of lower regulation, lower taxes, and greater predictability.
Europe ultimately confirmed the shift not because of ideological affinity, but because of internal contrast. In 2025, several of the continent’s main regulated democracies entered a simultaneous crisis of performance, debt, and legitimacy. France is today the clearest case. Under Emmanuel Macron, the country ended the year with approval ratings around 15%, facing successive cabinet reshuffles, recurring protests, and legislative paralysis. Unlike Italy, which reduced its deficit and regained confidence, French bonds were downgraded and financing costs increased, leading markets to begin perceiving France as the new focus of European fragility: high debt, rigid social demands, and an almost exhausted political margin to correct course.
Germany is going through a different but equally revealing crisis. After winning with a clear mandate for fiscal correction and competitiveness recovery, Friedrich Merz blurred the expectation of a conservative right by betting on greater state intervention, large public funds, and the relaxation of the debt brake. The result was a rapid loss of political legitimacy, growth close to zero, and persistent deterioration of industrial competitiveness, especially in energy. At the same time, the rise of Alternative für Deutschland above 20% reflects fatigue with a State that regulates too much and solves too little.
Spain deserves severe judgment. Pedro Sánchez’s refusal to assume political responsibility, despite the multiple corruption cases surrounding his inner circle and the PSOE’s sustained defeats in polls and regional elections —with emblematic losses such as Valencia— has deepened the crisis of institutional trust. The combination of persistent deficits, high tax pressure, and permanent political conflict has eroded the government’s credibility. It is no surprise that, if elections were called, polls project a clear victory for the right, led by the Popular Party and VOX.
The pattern is unmistakable. Voters are moving toward those who commit to restoring fiscal order, security, growth, employment, and the hope of a better life. And when the regulatory State cannot provide it, citizens seek alternatives that restore rules, predictability, and work.
That same shift is already visible in Latin America. After an almost hegemonic cycle of left-wing governments, crises, economic deterioration, and insecurity have begun to reorder the electoral map. In Chile, the defeat of a communist candidate and the electoral advance of José Antonio Kast’s right marked a turning point against the refounding project. In Argentina, Javier Milei’s legislative consolidation ended up validating his program. In Colombia, the deterioration of security and economic uncertainty have eroded the base of Gustavo Petro’s project, and polls show the electorate shifting toward options focused on order and growth.
Thus, my prediction for 2026 is clear: the global political board will tend to reorganize itself around two right-wing models that are delivering results. On one side, a pragmatic right, in the style of Trump, Milei, and Meloni, focused on fiscal discipline, security, growth, and employment. On the other, a liberal right that, as in Switzerland or the Nordic countries, bets on clear rules, high competitiveness, and a State limited in functions, though socially complementary. It is not an ideological fashion: it is the rational response of societies tired of promises that do not translate into a better life.
Guatemala observes this shift from an uncomfortable position. Bernardo Arévalo’s government has failed to make a government work that delivers results: very limited in its execution capacity and increasingly tempted to use the budget and regulation as political tools. The excessive growth of spending, the imposition of a minimum wage that will hurt small entrepreneurs and young people, and the inability to solve basic problems of security, infrastructure, and mobility feed a social frustration that will inevitably seek a different, more competent, and more experienced alternative. We must avoid falling into the temptation of populist governments that claim to be right-wing while promoting an interventionist and regulatory State over the lives of citizens. As we have already seen in Europe, that is not the solution.
That is why this global change is not the revenge of an ideology. It is the revenge of common sense. The confirmation of a truth that the West seemed to forget: the republic does not exist to equalize everyone in scarcity, but to guarantee the freedom that allows the majority to aspire to a better life. And at this historical turning point, Guatemala is still in time to choose wisely.
President of the Center for Thought and Action: Factoría Libertatis
References
- Eurostat – Fiscal deficit, employment, and employment rates in the European Union. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat
- Ministry of Economy and Finance (Italy) – Public finances and fiscal deficit. https://www.mef.gov.it
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- Frontex – European Border and Coast Guard Agency – Irregular migratory flows in the Mediterranean. https://www.frontex.europa.eu
- ENIT – National Tourism Agency (Italy) – 2025 tourism data. https://www.enit.it
- INDEC – National Institute of Statistics and Census (Argentina) – Inflation and employment. https://www.indec.gob.ar
- Ministry of Economy of the Argentine Republic – Fiscal results and financial surplus. https://www.argentina.gob.ar/economia
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- S&P Dow Jones Indices – S&P 500 performance. https://www.spglobal.com/spdji
- Real-Time Crime Index – AH Datalytics – Variation in homicides in the United States. https://www.ahdatalytics.com
- INSEE – National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (France) – Deficit, debt, and economic performance. https://www.insee.fr
- Agence France Trésor – Financing costs and French sovereign debt. https://www.aft.gouv.fr
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- Destatis – Federal Statistical Office (Germany) – Economic growth and industrial competitiveness. https://www.destatis.de
- SERVEL – Chilean Electoral Service – Election results. https://www.servel.cl
